THE ATONEMENT AS MORAL GOVERNMENT AND PENAL SATISFACTION

THE ATONEMENT AS MORAL GOVERNMENT AND PENAL SATISFACTION

A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic-Theological Evaluation of
Charles Grandison Finney’s Doctrine of the Atonement

A Monograph

by

GBS jr

2020

Mercy and truth have met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other. - Psalm 85:10 (ESV)

Chapter One

Introduction: The Atonement, Justice, and the Problem of Forgiveness

The doctrine of the atonement occupies a uniquely central position in Christian theology because it addresses the fundamental question raised by the gospel itself: how a holy and just God reconciles sinful humanity to Himself without compromising His own righteousness. At the cross of Jesus Christ converge themes of judgment and mercy, law and grace, wrath and forgiveness, divine sovereignty and human responsibility. While Scripture speaks with a rich plurality of metaphors to describe the saving work of Christ, the church has consistently recognized that these metaphors must ultimately cohere in a theologically intelligible account of how Christ’s death effects reconciliation.

Throughout the history of Christian thought, disagreement over the atonement has rarely concerned whether Christ’s death is necessary or saving, but rather how it saves. From patristic reflections on victory over death and the powers of evil, through medieval satisfaction theories, to Reformation articulations of penal substitution, the church has sought to articulate how divine justice is upheld in the act of forgiveness. These doctrinal developments have never been purely speculative. They have shaped preaching, pastoral care, moral formation, and the church’s understanding of grace itself. Consequently, debates over the atonement are never merely academic; they directly influence the character of Christian discipleship and the moral imagination of the faithful.

In modern theology, the doctrine of penal substitution has been both vigorously defended and sharply criticized. Its defenders regard it as the heart of the gospel, insisting that without the satisfaction of divine justice through Christ’s substitutionary death, forgiveness becomes arbitrary and grace loses its costliness. Its critics, however, argue that penal substitution risks portraying God as vindictive, justice as retributive excess, and salvation as a legal fiction that severs forgiveness from transformation. These concerns have generated alternative models of the atonement that emphasize moral influence, participation, narrative coherence, or public justice.

Among the most significant and controversial contributors to this alternative trajectory is Charles Grandison Finney. Writing in the context of nineteenth-century American revivalism, Finney articulated a governmental theory of the atonement that explicitly rejected classical penal substitution. He argued that the atonement does not consist in Christ bearing the exact legal penalty of sin, but in a public, moral demonstration that upholds the authority of divine law while making forgiveness possible. Finney’s concern was not to diminish the seriousness of sin or the necessity of the cross, but to preserve moral responsibility, intelligible justice, and genuine repentance.

Finney’s doctrine has often been dismissed as theologically deficient or dismissed without careful engagement. In Reformed theology, he is frequently portrayed as abandoning substitutionary atonement in favor of moral pragmatism. Conversely, in some modern critiques of penal substitution, Finney is treated as an early ally whose insights anticipate contemporary dissatisfaction with retributive models of justice. Both responses tend to oversimplify Finney’s position. He was neither a mere moral influence theorist nor a casual innovator, but a theologian driven by serious pastoral and ethical concerns.

This monograph contends that Finney’s doctrine of the atonement deserves sustained theological evaluation rather than summary dismissal. At the same time, it argues that Finney’s governmental theory ultimately fails to account adequately for the covenantal, forensic, and substitutionary logic of the biblical witness. While Finney rightly identified dangers associated with distorted presentations of penal substitution, his rejection of substitution itself rests on an insufficient account of divine justice, sin, and representation. The biblical portrayal of the cross, this study argues, integrates public justice and moral transformation within a framework of covenantal penal satisfaction rather than in opposition to it.

Penal substitution is the heart of the gospel precisely because it shows God taking responsibility for His own law. - J.I. Packer, What Did the Cross Achieve?

The significance of this study lies in its attempt to bring Finney into serious dialogue with contemporary atonement theology. Modern debates increasingly echo Finney’s concerns, particularly objections to retributive justice, the morality of substitution, and the pastoral effects of substitutionary preaching. By examining Finney’s theology in depth—biblically, historically, and systematically—this monograph seeks to clarify whether these concerns require rejection of penal substitution or whether they can be addressed through more faithful articulation and proclamation of the doctrine.

Methodologically, this study proceeds in three interrelated movements. First, it adopts a historical approach, situating Finney within his biographical, revivalist, and theological context and tracing the development of governmental atonement theory from its early formulations in Hugo Grotius through its expansion in nineteenth-century American theology. Second, it engages in close exegetical analysis of key biblical texts central to atonement theology, with particular attention to passages most contested between governmental and penal-substitutionary interpretations. Third, it offers a systematic-theological evaluation of the competing models, assessing their coherence with respect to doctrines of justice, sin, covenant, divine wrath, forgiveness, and moral transformation.

The scope of this study is intentionally focused. It does not attempt to provide an exhaustive survey of all atonement models, nor does it offer a comprehensive history of revivalism or American theology. Rather, it concentrates on the specific theological problem posed by Finney’s governmental theory and its implications for contemporary doctrine and practice. The analysis is conducted primarily within the framework of Protestant theology, with particular attention to Reformed and Wesleyan traditions, though broader ecumenical insights are engaged where relevant.

The chapters that follow advance this argument in a deliberate sequence. Chapter Two examines the life, ministry, and theological formation of Charles Grandison Finney, demonstrating how his biography and pastoral context shaped his doctrinal commitments. Chapter Three situates Finney within the broader historical and theological background of governmental atonement theory and nineteenth-century American theology. Chapter Four surveys the contemporary scholarly literature on the atonement, identifying key debates and unresolved tensions. Chapter Five offers an exegetical study of the biblical texts most central to the doctrine of the atonement. Chapter Six traces the historical development of governmental atonement theory, culminating in Finney’s formulation. Chapter Seven provides a systematic-theological evaluation of governmental and penal-substitutionary models. The final chapter draws together the findings of the study and reflects on their implications for theology, preaching, and Christian life.

The enduring challenge addressed by this monograph is not whether the cross reveals divine justice or divine love, but how it reveals both without contradiction. Charles Grandison Finney stands as a reminder that theology is always accountable to its moral and pastoral effects. The task of this study is to determine whether Finney’s solution succeeds in honoring the full witness of Scripture, or whether the justice he sought to preserve is most faithfully upheld in the very doctrine he rejected.

Chapter Two

Grace is not opposed to effort; it is opposed to earning. - Dallas Willard

Charles Grandison Finney: Life, Theology, and Pastoral Motivation

Any serious theological engagement with Charles Grandison Finney’s doctrine of the atonement must begin with an appreciation of the man himself. Finney’s theology cannot be separated from his life, nor can his doctrinal innovations be understood apart from the pastoral and cultural contexts in which they emerged. Unlike many systematic theologians whose work developed primarily within academic institutions, Finney was first and foremost a revivalist pastor. His theology arose not from detached speculation but from sustained engagement with conversion, moral reform, and the practical demands of preaching to ordinary people. As a result, his doctrinal commitments reflect a deep concern for moral intelligibility, human responsibility, and the ethical consequences of belief.

Charles Grandison Finney was born in 1792 in Warren, Connecticut, and raised in a frontier environment shaped by rapid social change and religious ferment. His family moved westward to upstate New York, a region that would later become known as the “Burned-Over District” because of the intensity and frequency of revival activity. Finney’s early life was marked by limited formal education and exposure to a religious landscape characterized by competing denominations, itinerant preachers, and a strong emphasis on personal conversion. This setting fostered in him a skepticism toward inherited authority and a confidence in the capacity of individuals to respond rationally and morally to truth.

Before entering ministry, Finney trained as a lawyer. This legal education profoundly shaped his intellectual habits and theological instincts. He learned to think in terms of moral responsibility, evidence, persuasion, and the intelligibility of justice. Law, for Finney, was not an abstract system but a rational structure designed to promote order and accountability within society. When Finney later turned to theology, he carried these assumptions with him, approaching divine law as something that must be understandable and morally coherent if it is to command genuine obedience.

Finney’s conversion in 1821 marked a decisive turning point in his life. By his own account, his conversion was not the result of emotional manipulation or gradual spiritual development, but of a conscious encounter with the claims of God upon his will. This experience reinforced his conviction that salvation involves deliberate moral choice rather than passive reception. Almost immediately after his conversion, Finney sensed a call to preach, and he soon emerged as one of the most effective revivalists of his generation.

Finney’s revival preaching differed in important ways from that of earlier evangelists. While he shared their emphasis on repentance and conversion, he rejected techniques that relied on emotional excess or perceived coercion. Instead, he appealed directly to the conscience and reason of his hearers. He believed that sinners must be confronted with their responsibility before God and pressed to make an immediate decision. This emphasis on the will as the seat of moral agency would later shape his understanding of sin, grace, and atonement.

As Finney’s ministry expanded, so did his involvement in broader social reform movements, including abolitionism and temperance. He viewed these causes not as distractions from the gospel, but as expressions of Christian obedience. This integration of theology and ethics reinforced his belief that true religion produces tangible moral transformation. Any doctrine that appeared to weaken moral obligation or excuse sin struck Finney as fundamentally defective.

It was in this pastoral and reformist context that Finney began to question prevailing theological systems. He became increasingly critical of doctrines associated with Calvinism, particularly original sin, imputed guilt, and unconditional election. Finney believed that these doctrines, as commonly understood, undermined human responsibility and conflicted with the moral nature of divine government. His objections were not merely theoretical. He observed that many professing Christians appealed to Christ’s righteousness while living lives marked by spiritual complacency. In his judgment, theology was partly to blame.

Moral Government and Revivalism

Moral government theology flourished in nineteenth-century American revivalism, where doctrine was evaluated by its moral effects. God was understood as governing free moral agents through laws designed to promote the highest good. Justice functioned to deter sin and preserve order rather than to satisfy retributive demands. This framework aligned with democratic ideals and reform movements and strongly influenced Charles G. Finney’s theology, especially his rejection of penal substitution.

Finney did not deny the reality of sin or the necessity of Christ’s death. On the contrary, he insisted that sin was a willful violation of known obligation and that forgiveness required divine action. However, he rejected any account of salvation that portrayed sinners as passive recipients of grace or depicted God as acting in ways that defied moral intuition. For Finney, theology had to be not only biblically grounded but morally intelligible. God’s justice, he argued, must make sense to rational moral agents if it is to command reverence and obedience.

Finney’s appointment as a professor, and later president, at Oberlin College provided him with an institutional base from which to articulate his theological views more systematically. Oberlin was a center of reformist and abolitionist thought, and its theological ethos aligned closely with Finney’s emphasis on holiness and social responsibility. It was during this period that Finney delivered and later published his Lectures on Systematic Theology, a work intended not for academic specialists but for ministers engaged in preaching and pastoral care.

The Lectures reveal Finney’s conviction that theology must be practical, coherent, and oriented toward moral reform. He rejected speculative metaphysics and insisted that doctrines be judged by their ability to promote holiness. His treatment of the atonement in Lecture XXXIV reflects this approach. Finney framed the doctrine not primarily in terms of metaphysical satisfaction or legal imputation, but in terms of moral government and public justice. He sought to explain how God could forgive sin without encouraging further rebellion and without acting unjustly.

Finney’s rejection of penal substitution must therefore be understood as part of a broader theological vision shaped by revivalism, moral reform, and a commitment to human responsibility. He was not attempting to minimize the cross, but to defend its moral significance. In his view, portraying Christ as bearing the exact penalty of sin risked making forgiveness automatic and obedience optional. By contrast, a governmental account of the atonement preserved the seriousness of sin, the necessity of repentance, and the integrity of divine law.

At the same time, Finney’s theology reflects the limitations of his context. His confidence in human moral capacity, his suspicion of inherited guilt, and his emphasis on rational intelligibility align closely with Enlightenment moral philosophy. These influences shaped both the strengths and weaknesses of his system. They enabled him to articulate a theology that resonated powerfully with revival audiences, but they also inclined him to reinterpret biblical categories in ways that strained the covenantal and forensic dimensions of Scripture.

This chapter has sought to present Finney as he understood himself: a pastor-theologian driven by concern for moral seriousness and practical godliness. His doctrine of the atonement cannot be dismissed as mere heterodoxy without reckoning with the pastoral motivations that animated it. At the same time, understanding those motivations does not require agreement with his conclusions. The chapters that follow will situate Finney’s theology within its broader historical context, engage the scholarly literature surrounding the atonement, and test his claims against the biblical and systematic witness of Christian theology.

Chapter Three

Justice is not a tool God uses; it is the form His love must take in a fallen world. - Oliver O'Donovan

Historical Context and Theological Background

Charles Grandison Finney’s doctrine of the atonement did not arise in isolation. It emerged at the intersection of long-standing theological debates about divine justice and forgiveness and the distinctive cultural, intellectual, and ecclesial conditions of nineteenth-century America. To understand Finney’s governmental theory adequately, it is necessary to trace both the earlier theological developments that shaped it and the historical forces that rendered it plausible and persuasive to his contemporaries. This chapter therefore situates Finney within the broader history of atonement theology, with particular attention to the development of governmental models and the revivalist context in which Finney worked.

The roots of governmental atonement theory are most clearly identified in the work of the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius. Grotius developed his account in response to Socinian challenges to the necessity of the atonement. Socinian theologians argued that if God is sovereign, He may forgive sin without satisfaction or penalty. Forgiveness, on this view, is an act of divine will unconstrained by considerations of justice. Grotius rejected this position, insisting that God’s governance of the moral universe requires that the authority of law be upheld. However, he also resisted the Reformed claim that justice demands the exact execution of the law’s penalty upon a substitute.

Grotius reframed the problem by emphasizing God’s role as moral governor. Law, in his account, exists for the preservation of moral order, and punishment functions primarily as a means of deterrence rather than as an intrinsic necessity of justice. God may therefore relax the penalty of the law, provided that the law’s authority is publicly vindicated. The suffering of Christ serves this purpose by demonstrating God’s opposition to sin and maintaining respect for divine law. In this framework, Christ does not bear the precise penalty owed by sinners, but His death renders forgiveness morally intelligible.

Although Grotius’s theory was initially developed to defend the necessity of the atonement, it represented a significant shift in emphasis. Justice was no longer conceived primarily in retributive or covenantal terms, but in governmental and pedagogical ones. While Grotius affirmed substitution in a broad sense, he rejected the notion that Christ’s death involved the literal transfer of guilt or the execution of the law’s penalty. This reconfiguration of justice would later prove foundational for Finney’s theology.

Within Protestant theology, governmental themes were received unevenly. Reformed theologians largely rejected Grotius’s account as insufficiently attentive to the biblical language of curse, wrath, and satisfaction. Wesleyan and Arminian traditions, however, found elements of governmental theory congenial, particularly its emphasis on moral order and human responsibility. John Wesley himself affirmed substitutionary atonement while frequently framing the cross as a demonstration of God’s displeasure with sin and a means of upholding divine government. This ambivalence created space for later theologians to emphasize governmental motifs more strongly.

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, theological discourse in America was increasingly shaped by Enlightenment moral philosophy, democratic ideals, and a growing suspicion of inherited authority. Scottish Common Sense Realism, with its emphasis on moral intuition and rational apprehension of truth, exerted considerable influence on American theology. Justice, in this intellectual climate, was often understood in terms of fairness and moral intelligibility rather than covenantal necessity. Doctrines that appeared to violate ordinary moral reasoning—such as imputed guilt or vicarious punishment—were increasingly questioned.

At the same time, the Second Great Awakening transformed the religious landscape. Revivalism emphasized personal conversion, immediate decision, and moral reform. Preachers addressed diverse and often theologically untrained audiences, prioritizing clarity and urgency over confessional precision. Theology was judged by its practical effects, particularly its capacity to produce repentance, holiness, and social change. In this environment, doctrines perceived as undermining moral responsibility or encouraging passivity were subject to intense scrutiny.

Hugo Grotius and Governmental Atonement

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is the principal source of governmental atonement theory. Responding to Socinian claims that God could forgive sin without satisfaction, Grotius argued that God governs the moral universe and must uphold respect for divine law. Punishment, in his view, serves a deterrent function rather than satisfying intrinsic retributive demands. Christ’s death therefore operates as a public demonstration of God’s opposition to sin, preserving moral order while permitting forgiveness. Though Grotius retained some substitutionary elements, his redefinition of justice laid the groundwork for later governmental models, most notably in the theology of Charles G. Finney.

Finney emerged as a leading figure within this revivalist movement, and his theology reflects its defining characteristics. He shared the revivalists’ confidence in human moral agency and their insistence that salvation involves a decisive act of the will. He also shared their concern that theology must be intelligible to ordinary people and effective in producing moral transformation. These commitments shaped his reception of earlier atonement theories and predisposed him toward a governmental framework.

Within nineteenth-century American theology, debates over Calvinism and Arminianism further intensified these dynamics. Calvinist doctrines of original sin, imputation, and unconditional election were increasingly challenged by theologians who feared that they diminished human responsibility and contradicted moral intuition. Finney’s theology represents one of the most thoroughgoing rejections of Calvinist soteriology in this period. His governmental theory of the atonement must be understood as part of this broader rejection, rather than as an isolated doctrinal innovation.

It is important to note that Finney did not simply adopt Grotius’s theory wholesale. While Grotius sought to defend the necessity of the atonement against denial, Finney employed governmental theory to critique what he regarded as moral incoherence within orthodox Protestantism. Finney radicalized governmental motifs by denying that justice could ever be satisfied through penal substitution. In doing so, he moved beyond Grotius and Wesley toward a more comprehensive redefinition of justice, law, and forgiveness.

The historical reception of Finney’s theology was deeply divided. Admirers praised his moral clarity, evangelistic effectiveness, and commitment to reform. Critics accused him of abandoning historic Christian doctrines and subordinating revelation to moral philosophy. Reformed theologians in particular argued that Finney’s governmental theory undermined the biblical doctrines of justification and substitution. These debates reveal that Finney’s theology touched a nerve precisely because it addressed fundamental questions about the nature of God, justice, and salvation.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate that Finney’s doctrine of the atonement is best understood as the product of both inherited theological traditions and distinctive cultural forces. Governmental atonement theory provided a conceptual framework that resonated with Enlightenment moral reasoning and revivalist priorities. Nineteenth-century American theology supplied the context in which that framework could be expanded and radicalized. Understanding this background does not resolve the theological questions Finney raised, but it clarifies why those questions took the form they did.

The chapters that follow move from historical description to critical engagement. Having situated Finney within his intellectual and ecclesial context, the study now turns to the contemporary scholarly literature on the atonement, before examining the biblical texts themselves. Only then can a systematic evaluation be undertaken that does justice to both Finney’s concerns and the scriptural witness he sought to interpret.

Chapter Four

Jesus did not simply die to show us love; he died because justice demanded it - and love was willing to pay it. - Timothy Keller, The Reason for God

Literature Review: Governmental Atonement, Penal Substitution, and Contemporary Debate

Modern discussion of the atonement is marked by both continuity and fragmentation. While the church has long confessed that Christ’s death reconciles sinners to God, contemporary theology exhibits deep disagreement over how that reconciliation is accomplished and how it ought to be proclaimed. The literature reviewed in this chapter reflects a persistent tension between accounts that emphasize penal satisfaction and those that prioritize moral, governmental, narrative, or participatory dimensions of the cross. This chapter surveys the principal contributions to these debates, situating Charles Grandison Finney’s governmental theory within the broader scholarly conversation and identifying the unresolved questions that this monograph addresses.

Among contemporary defenses of penal substitution, John Stott’s The Cross of Christ remains foundational. Stott’s work is significant not only because it affirms substitutionary atonement, but because it does so with careful attention to moral and pastoral concerns. Stott explicitly rejects commercial or mechanical accounts of substitution, insisting instead that the cross must be understood as the place where God satisfies His own justice through self-giving love. By framing penal substitution covenantally and relationally, Stott seeks to preserve both the objective accomplishment of redemption and its transformative implications. His insistence that substitution intensifies rather than diminishes the seriousness of sin directly addresses concerns later articulated by Finney and echoed in modern critiques.

J. I. Packer’s influential essay “What Did the Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substitution” further articulates the coherence of substitutionary atonement. Packer argues that penal substitution is not one metaphor among many, but the integrating reality that gives coherence to the biblical language of sacrifice, redemption, and reconciliation. He emphasizes propitiation as the turning away of divine wrath and contends that any account of the atonement that neglects this dimension fails to reckon with the gravity of sin. Packer’s work has been widely cited as a definitive modern defense of substitution, particularly in response to governmental and moral-influence theories.

More recent systematic and analytic theologians have sought to refine penal substitution conceptually. Oliver Crisp has argued that many objections to substitution rest on misunderstandings of imputation and punishment. He distinguishes between moral culpability and forensic reckoning, contending that Christ’s bearing of sin does not entail that He becomes morally guilty. By framing substitution within a legal-representational framework, Crisp seeks to demonstrate that penal substitution can be both morally coherent and biblically grounded. Stephen Holmes likewise emphasizes that substitutionary atonement, as articulated in the Reformed tradition, presupposes covenantal representation rather than arbitrary transfer. These works are especially relevant for engaging Finney’s objection that punishment of the innocent is inherently unjust.

Alongside these defenses, a substantial body of literature has emerged that critiques penal substitution on theological, moral, and hermeneutical grounds. N. T. Wright’s The Day the Revolution Began represents one of the most prominent recent contributions in this vein. Wright resists making penal substitution the controlling framework for atonement theology, arguing instead that the cross must be understood within the narrative of Israel’s exile and restoration. While Wright does not deny substitutionary elements, he emphasizes victory, covenant, and new creation, suggesting that penal substitution has often been abstracted from its biblical narrative context. Wright’s emphasis on the public and cosmic dimensions of the cross resonates with governmental concerns, even as he distances himself from Finney’s explicit rejection of substitution.

Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker’s Recovering the Scandal of the Cross offers a more direct critique of penal substitution, arguing that it reflects Western legal categories rather than the relational and narrative patterns of Scripture. They contend that substitutionary models risk portraying God as violent and justice as retributive excess. Although their conclusions differ from Finney’s, their moral objections parallel his concern that substitution undermines the character of God and the moral seriousness of forgiveness.

Fleming Rutledge’s The Crucifixion occupies a distinctive position within contemporary literature. While she offers a robust affirmation of divine wrath and substitution, she situates these themes within an apocalyptic and pastoral framework that emphasizes the defeat of evil and the seriousness of judgment. Rutledge’s work challenges both shallow critiques of substitution and overly narrow defenses of it. Her insistence that the cross confronts the full reality of sin and evil provides a counterpoint to governmental theories that downplay retributive justice, while also addressing Finney’s concern that theology must reckon honestly with moral reality.

Penal Substitution and Justice

Penal substitution teaches that Christ bore the penalty of sin on behalf of sinners, satisfying divine justice so that forgiveness might be granted without compromising holiness. Classical defenders emphasize covenantal representation rather than arbitrary transfer: Christ suffers as the appointed head of His people, not as an unrelated innocent party. When articulated covenantally rather than commercially, penal substitution presents the cross as the place where God judges sin in Himself, uniting justice and mercy rather than setting them in opposition.

Literature engaging governmental and moral dimensions of the atonement provides further context for assessing Finney’s theology. Although few contemporary theologians explicitly adopt governmental theory in its classical form, many emphasize themes central to it. Joshua McNall has offered one of the clearest recent treatments of governmental atonement, arguing that it should be understood as an alternative account of how divine justice functions rather than as a denial of justice altogether. McNall’s work is particularly valuable for situating Finney historically and exploring whether governmental theory can be reformulated in light of contemporary biblical scholarship.

The relationship between justice and forgiveness has also been explored in philosophical and theological literature that intersects with atonement theology. Miroslav Volf’s Exclusion and Embrace argues that forgiveness without justice trivializes evil and undermines reconciliation. Although Volf does not propose a specific atonement model, his insistence that justice and mercy must be held together has been influential in contemporary discussions. His work highlights the difficulty faced by purely governmental accounts: if justice is reduced to demonstration or deterrence, the moral weight of forgiveness may be diminished rather than preserved.

Oliver O’Donovan’s The Ways of Judgment similarly emphasizes the intrinsic role of judgment in moral reality. O’Donovan argues that judgment is not merely instrumental but constitutive of justice. This perspective poses a significant challenge to governmental theories that define justice primarily in terms of outcomes or moral pedagogy. His work reinforces the concern that Finney’s redefinition of justice risks detaching it from divine holiness.

Pastoral and ethical treatments of the atonement further illuminate the stakes of these debates. Dallas Willard’s The Divine Conspiracy critiques what he describes as a “gospel of sin management,” in which forgiveness is divorced from transformation. Although Willard does not reject penal substitution, his work echoes Finney’s insistence that theology must produce genuine discipleship. Scot McKnight’s A Community Called Atonement explores how different atonement models shape ecclesial identity and moral imagination, suggesting that substitutionary atonement must be integrated within a broader narrative of reconciliation and community formation.

Timothy Keller’s apologetic writings engage contemporary objections to penal substitution, particularly the claim that it portrays God as abusive or unjust. Keller argues that substitutionary atonement, rightly understood, reveals God’s love precisely through His willingness to bear judgment Himself. His work demonstrates that many of the moral concerns raised by Finney and modern critics can be addressed without abandoning substitution.

This survey of the literature reveals both convergence and persistent disagreement. Finney’s concerns regarding moral responsibility, justice, and the pastoral effects of theology continue to surface in contemporary critiques of penal substitution. At the same time, modern defenses of substitution have become increasingly nuanced, emphasizing covenant, representation, and transformation in ways that address many of Finney’s objections. The gap this monograph seeks to address lies in the sustained engagement between Finney’s governmental theory and these contemporary developments. While Finney is often cited, he is rarely examined in depth alongside modern exegetical and systematic scholarship. By bringing his theology into conversation with contemporary debates, this study aims to clarify whether the concerns he raised necessitate rejection of penal substitution or can be resolved through more faithful articulation of the doctrine.

Chapter Five

Forgiveness flounders because I exclude the enemy from the community of humans - even as I exclude myself from the community of sinners. - Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace

Exegetical Foundations of the Atonement: Justice, Substitution, and Moral Government in Scripture

Any theological evaluation of the atonement must ultimately be governed by Scripture. Historical developments, philosophical coherence, and pastoral concerns are all secondary to the question of how the biblical text itself presents the meaning and necessity of Christ’s death. This chapter therefore undertakes a sustained exegetical analysis of the primary scriptural passages that inform the doctrine of the atonement, with particular attention to those texts most frequently invoked in debates between governmental and penal-substitutionary models. The aim is not to impose a single metaphor upon the biblical witness, but to discern whether the logic of Scripture supports a primarily governmental account of the atonement or requires a more robust substitutionary framework.

The Old Testament sacrificial system provides the indispensable background for New Testament atonement theology. From its earliest expressions, Israel’s worship presupposed that sin disrupted covenantal fellowship with God and that reconciliation required the dealing of sin through divinely appointed means. Leviticus 17:11 stands as a programmatic statement of this logic: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to make atonement for your souls.” The text emphasizes divine initiative—God gives the means of atonement—and identifies blood as the life offered in place of life. While the sacrificial system employed symbolic actions, these symbols enacted covenantal realities rather than serving merely didactic purposes. The substitutionary structure of sacrifice, in which an innocent victim dies so that the guilty may live, establishes a conceptual pattern that cannot be reduced to moral demonstration alone.

The Day of Atonement ritual described in Leviticus 16 further reinforces this pattern. The two-goat ceremony dramatizes both the removal of guilt and the satisfaction of divine holiness. The scapegoat symbolically bears the sins of the people into the wilderness, while the sacrificial goat is slain and its blood brought into the Holy of Holies. Together, these actions depict sin as a burden that must be removed and a defilement that must be cleansed. While Finney is correct to observe that guilt is not transferred in a literal or metaphysical sense, the ritual nevertheless presupposes that sin is dealt with through substitutionary death rather than mere deterrence or public display.

The prophetic literature both affirms and critiques this sacrificial logic. Prophets such as Isaiah, Amos, and Micah denounce sacrifices offered without repentance, insisting that ritual without obedience is offensive to God. Yet this critique does not negate the sacrificial system itself; it condemns its misuse. Sacrifice is never presented as a substitute for repentance, but as God’s appointed means of reconciliation for a repentant people. This balance anticipates later tensions in atonement theology and supports Finney’s insistence that forgiveness must be connected to moral transformation, even as it preserves substitutionary logic.

Isaiah 53 occupies a central place in biblical atonement theology and poses a decisive challenge to purely governmental interpretations. The Servant is described as suffering vicariously: “He was pierced for our transgressions… and the Lord has laid on him the iniquity of us all.” Finney interprets this passage representationally, arguing that the Servant suffers because of sin rather than bearing its penalty. However, the text consistently employs substitutionary language. The Servant bears iniquities, is chastised for the sake of others, and makes his life an offering for guilt. The Hebrew term ʾāšām refers specifically to a guilt offering within the Levitical system, a category that presupposes substitutionary satisfaction rather than moral example alone.

Moreover, Isaiah 53 attributes the Servant’s suffering directly to divine agency: “It was the will of the Lord to crush him.” This assertion resists any interpretation that frames the atonement merely as a public signal to moral agents. The suffering of the Servant is not accidental or merely illustrative; it is divinely purposed to accomplish peace, healing, and justification for many. While the passage certainly has moral and revelatory dimensions, its primary thrust is redemptive and substitutionary.

Pastoral Stakes in Atonement Theology

Atonement theology shapes how Christians understand sin, forgiveness, and obedience. Finney’s enduring concern was that distorted presentations of substitution encouraged moral complacency. While his solution was flawed, the concern remains valid. When substitution is severed from discipleship, it risks becoming license; when moral transformation replaces substitution, the cross becomes mere example. Faithful theology must hold together forgiveness and holiness, assurance and obedience.

The New Testament explicitly interprets Christ’s death in light of this Isaianic vision. Nowhere is this more evident than in Romans 3:21–26, a text frequently cited in support of governmental atonement because of its emphasis on demonstration. Paul declares that God put Christ forward as a hilastērion “to demonstrate his righteousness,” because God had previously passed over sins. Finney rightly emphasizes that the cross vindicates God’s justice. However, the means by which this vindication occurs is Christ’s blood. The term hilastērion evokes the mercy seat of the Day of Atonement, where blood was sprinkled to avert wrath. The demonstration of righteousness, therefore, is inseparable from propitiation. God is shown to be just precisely because He has dealt with sin decisively rather than merely signaling opposition to it.

Romans 5 further clarifies the covenantal structure underlying substitutionary atonement. Paul contrasts Adam and Christ as representative heads whose actions determine the standing of those they represent. “By the one man’s disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the one man’s obedience the many will be made righteous.” This federal logic provides the conceptual framework that governmental theories often lack. Christ’s substitution is not arbitrary punishment of an innocent party, but the covenantal action of the representative head of a redeemed people. Finney’s objection that guilt cannot be transferred fails to reckon with this biblical category of representation.

Second Corinthians 5:21 presents the logic of substitution in strikingly forensic terms: “For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God.” Attempts to interpret “made sin” as merely “treated as a sin offering” still presuppose sacrificial substitution. The parallelism of the verse suggests an exchange grounded in union with Christ rather than mere moral influence. The text does not imply that Christ became morally sinful, but it does assert that He bore sin in a way that effected real justification for those united to Him.

Galatians 3:10–13 intensifies this substitutionary logic by framing Christ’s death in terms of curse-bearing. Paul declares that Christ redeemed believers from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for them. The curse is not a pedagogical symbol but the covenantal sanction for disobedience. Redemption occurs because the curse is borne and exhausted in Christ. Governmental demonstration alone cannot explain how the curse itself is removed.

The Epistle to the Hebrews further underscores the finality and efficacy of Christ’s sacrifice. Hebrews presents Christ as the great high priest who enters the heavenly sanctuary with His own blood, securing eternal redemption. The repeated emphasis on once-for-all sacrifice indicates that Christ’s death accomplishes something objectively decisive. While Hebrews acknowledges the pedagogical role of the law and sacrificial system, it insists that Christ’s offering purifies the conscience and perfects those who draw near. These effects presuppose satisfaction rather than mere moral display.

Taken together, these texts reveal a consistent biblical pattern. The atonement is indeed public, moral, and revelatory, but it is also substitutionary, covenantal, and propitiatory. Scripture does not present these dimensions as competing explanations, but as mutually reinforcing aspects of a single redemptive act. The cross demonstrates God’s righteousness because it satisfies the demands of justice; it transforms sinners because it reconciles them to God through judgment borne on their behalf.

This exegetical analysis suggests that Finney’s governmental emphasis captures an important dimension of the atonement but cannot stand alone. The biblical witness consistently grounds moral transformation and public justice in substitutionary satisfaction. Any account of the atonement that severs these elements risks distorting the coherence of the scriptural narrative. The chapters that follow will trace how governmental theory developed historically and evaluate systematically whether Finney’s reformulation of justice can bear the weight Scripture places upon the cross. 

Chapter Six

The injustice objection to penal substitution fails once covenantal representation is properly understood. - Oliver D. Crisp

The Historical Development of Governmental Atonement Theory

The governmental theory of the atonement represents a distinct trajectory within the history of Christian theology, emerging as an attempt to account for divine justice and forgiveness without recourse to strict penal substitution. While Charles Grandison Finney stands as its most explicit and radical proponent in nineteenth-century American theology, the theory itself developed over several centuries in response to changing intellectual, moral, and ecclesial concerns. This chapter traces that development from its early formulations to its expansion in Finney’s theology, demonstrating how governmental atonement evolved from a mediating proposal into a comprehensive alternative framework. 

The earliest and most influential articulation of governmental atonement theory is found in the work of Hugo Grotius in the early seventeenth century. Grotius wrote in response to Socinian theologians who denied the necessity of the atonement altogether, arguing that God could forgive sin simply by an act of sovereign will. Against this position, Grotius insisted that forgiveness without satisfaction would undermine the moral order of the universe. God, as ruler of a moral community, must govern in a manner that sustains respect for law. To forgive sin without any public acknowledgment of its seriousness would invite further disobedience and weaken the authority of divine command.

At the same time, Grotius resisted the Reformed claim that justice requires the exact execution of the law’s penalty upon a substitute. He argued that the penalty attached to the law exists not as an intrinsic demand of justice but as a means of deterrence. Because the purpose of punishment is the preservation of moral order, God may relax the penalty provided that its deterrent function is fulfilled in another way. The suffering and death of Christ serve this function by publicly demonstrating God’s hatred of sin and His commitment to righteousness. Christ’s death, therefore, makes forgiveness possible without requiring literal penal substitution.

Grotius’s proposal was intentionally moderate. He did not deny substitutionary elements entirely, nor did he reduce the atonement to moral influence. Instead, he sought to preserve both the necessity of the atonement and the moral freedom of God. Nevertheless, his redefinition of justice marked a significant departure from classical satisfaction theories. Justice was no longer understood primarily as retributive or covenantal, but as governmental and instrumental.

Within Reformed theology, Grotius’s theory was generally regarded as inadequate. The Reformed tradition emphasized that divine justice is not merely a means to an end, but an expression of God’s holy character. As such, justice demands satisfaction rather than symbolic demonstration. Reformed critics argued that Grotius’s model risked portraying forgiveness as a matter of policy rather than covenantal fulfillment. Consequently, governmental theory found limited acceptance within confessional Calvinism.

In contrast, Arminian and Wesleyan traditions proved more receptive to governmental motifs. While John Wesley affirmed substitutionary atonement, he frequently framed Christ’s death as a demonstration of God’s displeasure with sin and a means of upholding divine government. Wesley resisted overly legal or commercial metaphors and emphasized that salvation must result in holiness of heart and life. This tension within Wesleyan theology—affirming substitution while emphasizing moral government—created space for later theologians to develop governmental themes more fully.

By the eighteenth century, broader intellectual currents further encouraged this development. Enlightenment moral philosophy emphasized rationality, moral intuition, and fairness as essential features of justice. Punishment was increasingly understood in terms of deterrence and social utility rather than intrinsic retribution. Within this intellectual climate, doctrines such as imputed guilt and vicarious punishment appeared morally suspect. Theological models that framed the atonement in terms of public justice and moral order resonated more readily with contemporary sensibilities.

The rise of revivalism in America accelerated these tendencies. Revivalist preaching prioritized immediate repentance, moral reform, and practical transformation. Theology was valued insofar as it produced observable ethical fruit. Doctrines perceived as encouraging passivity or excusing sin were increasingly rejected. It was within this context that governmental atonement theory found fertile ground, particularly among theologians and preachers concerned with the moral effects of belief.

Retributive Justice: A Misunderstood Category

Modern objections to penal substitution often assume that retributive justice is inherently vindictive or excessive. In classical Christian theology, however, retribution is not opposed to love but is an expression of moral truthfulness. To judge evil as evil is not cruelty but fidelity to goodness. When Scripture speaks of God’s judgment, it does so in the context of covenant, holiness, and restoration. Penal substitution does not portray God as delighting in punishment, but as refusing to deny the seriousness of sin even while acting to save sinners.

Charles Grandison Finney inherited these intellectual and pastoral currents and radicalized them. Unlike Grotius, who sought to defend the necessity of the atonement against its denial, Finney employed governmental theory as a critique of orthodox substitutionary theology. He rejected not only commercial models of satisfaction but also covenantal penal substitution as articulated by the Reformed tradition. In Finney’s account, justice cannot be satisfied through punishment of a substitute at all, because punishment is inherently personal and cannot be transferred.

Finney extended governmental theory by grounding it in a comprehensive moral philosophy. He defined law as a rule of action designed to promote the highest good of moral agents and justice as the enforcement of that rule for the sake of moral order. Within this framework, punishment serves a deterrent and instructive function rather than satisfying retributive demands. Christ’s suffering, therefore, upholds the authority of the law by demonstrating the seriousness of sin, even though it is not the execution of the law’s penalty.

This expansion marked a decisive shift. Whereas Grotius retained a place for substitutionary suffering within a moderated account of justice, Finney denied that substitutionary punishment could ever be just. He insisted that guilt is non-transferable and that justice requires the punishment of the guilty alone. As a result, Finney’s governmental theory functioned not as a mediating position but as an alternative soteriological system.

The reception of Finney’s theology reflected this shift. Admirers praised his clarity, moral seriousness, and revivalistic effectiveness. Critics, particularly within Reformed circles, accused him of abandoning historic Christian doctrine and subordinating Scripture to moral intuition. Charles Hodge famously argued that Finney’s theology reduced the atonement to a moral expedient and undermined the doctrine of justification. Even within Arminian traditions, Finney’s views were often regarded as extreme.

Despite this resistance, governmental themes continued to appear in later theology, often in modified forms. Twentieth-century moral influence, narrative, and participatory models echoed Finney’s emphasis on moral transformation and public meaning, even when they rejected his specific framework. Contemporary dissatisfaction with retributive justice and penal substitution frequently mirrors Finney’s concerns, suggesting that his theology anticipated enduring questions about the morality and intelligibility of the cross.

This historical survey demonstrates that governmental atonement theory has consistently emerged in contexts where theologians perceived traditional substitutionary models to be morally problematic or pastorally dangerous. Finney’s contribution represents the most thorough and systematic development of this tradition, shaped by revivalism, Enlightenment moral philosophy, and a deep concern for ethical transformation. Understanding this development clarifies both the appeal and the limitations of Finney’s doctrine.

The stage is now set for systematic evaluation. Having traced the historical evolution of governmental atonement theory and its culmination in Finney’s theology, the next chapter will assess whether this framework can adequately account for the biblical doctrines of justice, sin, covenant, and redemption. Only through such evaluation can the enduring theological significance of Finney’s project be properly judged.

Chapter Seven

The crucifixion is not an accident, nor merely an example; it is the divine judgment on Sin itself. - Fleming Rutledge

Systematic-Theological Evaluation: Governmental Atonement and Penal Substitution

The preceding chapters have traced the biblical foundations and historical development of governmental atonement theory, culminating in Charles Grandison Finney’s distinctive formulation. The task of this chapter is to evaluate that formulation systematically by examining its coherence with the central doctrines implicated in the atonement: divine justice, human sin and guilt, covenantal representation, divine wrath and propitiation, forgiveness, and moral transformation. Such an evaluation must move beyond isolated proof texts or pastoral intuitions to assess whether governmental theory can bear the full theological weight Scripture places upon the cross, and whether its alternative to penal substitution preserves the unity of God’s justice and grace.

At the heart of the disagreement between governmental and penal-substitutionary accounts lies a fundamental difference in the understanding of justice. Finney defines justice primarily in terms of moral government. For him, justice exists to secure the highest good of moral agents by upholding the authority of law and deterring wrongdoing. Punishment, accordingly, is instrumental rather than intrinsic. It serves a pedagogical and preventative purpose, communicating the seriousness of sin and discouraging future transgression. Within this framework, justice does not require the exact execution of a penalty; it requires only that the law’s authority be publicly maintained.

Penal substitution, as articulated within the Reformed tradition, begins from a different premise. Justice is not merely a means to an end but an essential expression of God’s holy character. The law’s penalty is not an arbitrary threat designed solely to deter, but the righteous judgment of God against sin. Forgiveness, therefore, cannot be understood apart from satisfaction. To forgive without judgment would be to deny God’s holiness rather than to express mercy. Penal substitution maintains that God remains just precisely by judging sin in Christ, who stands as the covenantal representative of His people.

This divergence in the nature of justice has far-reaching consequences. Finney’s model preserves divine freedom and moral intelligibility but risks reducing justice to prudence. Justice becomes what best maintains order rather than what necessarily corresponds to God’s nature. Penal substitution preserves justice as non-negotiable but requires a robust account of representation to avoid the charge of injustice. As shown in the exegetical analysis, Scripture provides such an account in its doctrine of covenantal headship, particularly in Romans 5, where Adam and Christ function as representative figures whose actions determine the standing of those united to them.

Closely related to the doctrine of justice is the doctrine of sin and guilt. Finney insists that guilt is strictly personal and cannot be transferred. Sin, in his account, consists of voluntary acts of disobedience, and responsibility cannot be shared or imputed. This emphasis reflects his commitment to moral agency and his resistance to any account of salvation that diminishes personal responsibility. However, Scripture presents sin not only as individual acts but as a condition embedded within covenantal structures. Humanity’s solidarity in Adam entails a form of corporate guilt that is not reducible to personal imitation. The biblical logic of redemption mirrors this structure: Christ’s obedience and death address sin at the level of covenantal representation rather than isolated moral action.

Penal substitution coheres naturally with this corporate understanding of sin. Guilt is not transferred arbitrarily but reckoned within a covenantal relationship. Christ does not become morally sinful, nor is He punished as a mere third party. He bears sin as the appointed head of a redeemed people. Finney’s rejection of imputation, while motivated by moral concern, fails to account for this biblical category and consequently narrows the scope of redemption to individual moral transactions.

The doctrine of divine wrath further differentiates the two models. Finney consistently minimizes wrath, reframing it as God’s opposition to sin expressed through governance rather than as a personal response grounded in holiness. While Scripture does affirm that God’s wrath is not capricious or vindictive, it nevertheless presents wrath as a real and personal aspect of God’s response to sin. The New Testament repeatedly describes Christ’s death as propitiatory, turning away divine wrath and reconciling sinners to God. Governmental theory struggles to accommodate this language without reinterpreting it metaphorically or pedagogically.

Counterpoint - Imputation: Legal Fiction or Covenant Reality?

Imputation is frequently criticized as a “legal fiction,” suggesting that righteousness or guilt is assigned without reference to reality. Biblically, however, imputation functions within covenantal relationships rather than abstract legal systems. Adam’s sin and Christ’s obedience are reckoned to those they represent because they truly stand in for them as covenant heads. Imputation, therefore, does not ignore moral reality; it establishes a new one. Finney’s rejection of imputation reflects concern for moral agency, but it also overlooks the deeply relational structure of biblical redemption.

Penal substitution, by contrast, integrates wrath within the logic of redemption. God’s wrath against sin is not denied or softened; it is borne by Christ in love. This bearing of wrath is not opposed to grace but is its necessary condition. As the exegetical analysis demonstrated, texts such as Romans 3, Galatians 3, and Hebrews presuppose that the problem addressed by the cross is not merely moral disorder but divine judgment. Any account of the atonement that sidelines this dimension risks presenting forgiveness as a suspension of justice rather than its fulfillment.

The doctrine of forgiveness itself reveals further contrasts. In Finney’s framework, forgiveness becomes possible because the atonement removes governmental obstacles. God may forgive because the moral order has been publicly upheld and future obedience secured. Forgiveness, in this sense, is a discretionary act grounded in prudence. In the penal-substitutionary account, forgiveness flows from satisfaction. God forgives because sin has been judged and dealt with in Christ. Forgiveness is not merely permissible; it is covenantally warranted. This distinction affects not only theology but assurance. In a governmental framework, forgiveness may appear contingent upon moral outcomes, whereas in substitutionary theology it rests upon a completed redemptive act.

At the same time, Finney’s emphasis on moral transformation exposes a genuine weakness in the way penal substitution has often been presented. When substitution is detached from union with Christ and sanctification, it can be misconstrued as license rather than liberation. Finney rightly insisted that forgiveness must not be proclaimed in a manner that undermines obedience. However, this concern does not require the rejection of penal substitution. Scripture consistently presents justification and sanctification as inseparable aspects of salvation. The same Christ who bears sin also reigns as Lord, and those united to Him are called into a life of holiness. The problem Finney identified lies not in substitution itself but in its distortion.

Systematically considered, the strengths of governmental theory lie in its insistence that the atonement has public, moral, and ethical significance. It resists reducing the cross to a private legal transaction and highlights the role of the atonement in sustaining moral order. Its weaknesses lie in its redefinition of justice, its inadequate account of covenantal representation, and its marginalization of divine wrath and satisfaction. Penal substitution, while vulnerable to misrepresentation, offers a more comprehensive account of the biblical data by grounding moral transformation in substitutionary reconciliation rather than substituting one for the other.

The most coherent theological account of the atonement, therefore, is not one that chooses between governmental and substitutionary concerns, but one that orders them rightly. The cross does indeed demonstrate God’s righteousness publicly and summon sinners to repentance. It does so precisely because it satisfies divine justice covenantally and exhausts the penalty of sin in Christ. Moral transformation is not the alternative to substitution; it is its fruit.

This systematic evaluation leads to a clear conclusion. Finney’s governmental theory arises from legitimate pastoral concern and highlights dimensions of the atonement that must not be neglected. Yet by rejecting penal substitution, it ultimately undermines the very justice it seeks to preserve. Scripture presents the cross as the place where God judges sin without compromise and forgives sinners without contradiction. Any theology of the atonement that fails to hold these realities together remains incomplete.

The final chapter will draw these findings together and reflect on their implications for theology, preaching, and Christian life, offering a concluding assessment of Finney’s legacy and the enduring meaning of the cross.

Chapter Eight

The necessity of Christ’s satisfaction lies not in the arbitrariness of God’s will, but in the perfection of His nature. - Jonathan Edwards

Final Conclusion: Justice Fulfilled, Grace Proclaimed

The doctrine of the atonement stands at the center of Christian theology because it addresses the most profound question raised by the gospel: how God can remain just while justifying the ungodly. This monograph has examined that question through sustained engagement with the governmental theory of the atonement as articulated by Charles Grandison Finney, placing his theology within its biographical, historical, exegetical, and systematic contexts. The aim has not been merely to assess Finney’s orthodoxy, but to determine whether his reformulation of the atonement succeeds in preserving the unity of divine justice and mercy revealed in Scripture.

Finney’s doctrine arose from sincere and pressing pastoral concerns. He feared that distorted presentations of penal substitution undermined moral responsibility, encouraged spiritual complacency, and rendered divine justice unintelligible. His emphasis on moral government, public justice, and the necessity of repentance reflects a deep commitment to holiness and ethical transformation. In this respect, Finney’s theology continues to resonate with modern critiques of atonement models perceived as legalistic, impersonal, or morally dangerous. This study has therefore sought to take Finney seriously as a theologian whose questions deserve careful consideration rather than summary dismissal.

At the same time, the exegetical analysis undertaken in this monograph has demonstrated that the biblical witness consistently grounds forgiveness in substitutionary, covenantal, and propitiatory categories. While Scripture certainly affirms that the cross publicly demonstrates God’s righteousness and summons sinners to repentance, it presents these realities as the consequence of a more fundamental act: God’s decisive judgment of sin in Christ. The sacrificial system of the Old Testament, the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53, the Pauline doctrines of justification and representation, and the priestly Christology of Hebrews all converge on the claim that Christ’s death accomplishes real reconciliation by bearing sin and its penalty on behalf of His people. Governmental demonstration alone cannot account for this depth and coherence.

Historically, the development of governmental atonement theory reveals a consistent pattern. From its early articulation in Hugo Grotius to its expansion in Finney’s theology, governmental theory has emerged in contexts where retributive justice and substitutionary punishment were perceived as morally problematic. While this tradition has rightly emphasized the public and ethical dimensions of the atonement, it has repeatedly struggled to sustain the biblical language of curse-bearing, wrath, and satisfaction. Finney’s theology represents the most thoroughgoing expression of this struggle, transforming governmental theory from a mediating proposal into a comprehensive alternative to penal substitution. In doing so, it exposes both the appeal and the limitations of redefining justice in purely instrumental terms.

The systematic evaluation conducted in this study has shown that Finney’s governmental framework ultimately falters at the point where justice is redefined rather than fulfilled. By construing justice primarily as deterrence and moral influence, Finney renders forgiveness a matter of prudence rather than covenantal accomplishment. His rejection of imputation and substitution, though motivated by concern for moral agency, fails to account for the biblical doctrine of covenantal representation, in which Christ stands as the head of a redeemed people. Without this category, the atonement is reduced to an external display rather than an internal reconciliation.

The Cross and Assurance

Atonement theology directly affects assurance of salvation. In a purely governmental framework, forgiveness can appear contingent upon ongoing moral outcomes, since the atonement functions as a permissive condition rather than a completed act. Penal substitution grounds assurance in Christ’s finished work: sin has been judged, the penalty borne, reconciliation achieved. This does not negate the call to holiness, but it secures obedience within assurance rather than anxiety. The pastoral implications of this difference are profound.

Nevertheless, Finney’s critique remains instructive. It exposes the danger of proclaiming penal substitution in abstraction from union with Christ, sanctification, and discipleship. When substitution is reduced to a legal mechanism divorced from transformation, it can indeed be misheard as license rather than liberation. Finney reminds the church that theology is always accountable to its moral and pastoral effects. A faithful doctrine of the atonement must therefore be proclaimed in a manner that calls sinners not only to trust in Christ’s finished work, but to live in obedience to His lordship.

The findings of this monograph suggest that the most faithful account of the atonement is one that integrates the concerns raised by governmental theory within a broader substitutionary framework rather than replacing it. The cross does uphold the authority of divine law and demonstrate God’s righteousness publicly. It does so precisely because it satisfies divine justice covenantally and exhausts the penalty of sin in Christ. Moral transformation flows from reconciliation; public justice is grounded in substitutionary judgment. These elements are not competitors but complements within the unified act of redemption.

Theologically, this conclusion affirms that divine justice and mercy are not held in tension at the cross, but are perfectly united. God does not relax justice in order to forgive; He fulfills justice in order to forgive. Grace is not opposed to judgment, but accomplished through it. This unity preserves the holiness of God while securing the assurance of believers, grounding forgiveness not in divine discretion alone but in completed redemption.

Pastorally, the implications are equally significant. Preaching the atonement must avoid both moralism and antinomianism. The cross must be proclaimed as the place where sin is judged without compromise and sinners are forgiven without condition. Such proclamation fosters both humility and obedience, assuring believers that their salvation rests upon Christ’s work while calling them to live as those who have been redeemed at great cost.

In assessing Charles Grandison Finney’s legacy, this monograph concludes that his doctrine of the atonement is theologically insufficient, yet pastorally provocative. He rightly perceived dangers in distorted accounts of substitution, but he sought to remedy those dangers by redefining justice rather than by recovering the full biblical richness of substitutionary atonement. His work serves as a cautionary example of how pastoral concern, when severed from covenantal and exegetical foundations, can lead theology astray even as it seeks moral faithfulness.

The enduring task of the church is to proclaim the cross of Christ as the supreme revelation of God’s character: a God who judges sin without compromise, forgives sinners without contradiction, and transforms lives by uniting them to the crucified and risen Lord. In that proclamation, the justice Finney sought to defend is not abandoned, but fulfilled; the grace he cherished is not weakened, but magnified. The atonement, rightly understood, remains the ground of Christian hope, obedience, and worship.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Finney, Charles G. Lectures on Systematic Theology. Oberlin, OH: James Steele, 1846.

Finney, Charles G. Memoirs of Charles G. Finney. New York: A. S. Barnes, 1876.

Grotius, Hugo. Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi. Leiden, 1617.

Wesley, John. The Works of John Wesley. Edited by Thomas Jackson. London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1872.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Henry Beveridge. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2008.

Secondary Sources (Historical & Systematic)

Aulén, Gustaf. Christus Victor. New York: Macmillan, 1931.

Hardman, Keith J. Charles Grandison Finney, 1792–1875: Revivalist and Reformer. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987.

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975.

Murray, John. Redemption Accomplished and Applied. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955.

Oden, Thomas C. The Transforming Power of Grace. Nashville: Abingdon, 1993.

Contemporary Theology and Atonement

Stott, John. The Cross of Christ. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986.

Wright, N. T. The Day the Revolution Began. New York: HarperOne, 2016.

Rutledge, Fleming. The Crucifixion: Understanding the Death of Jesus Christ. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015.

Gorman, Michael J. Inhabiting the Cruciform God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009.

Crisp, Oliver D. Deviant Calvinism. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014.

Holmes, Stephen R. The Logic of Penal Substitution. Scottish Journal of Theology 61, no. 1 (2008): 1–21.

McNall, Joshua. The Mosaic of Atonement. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2019.

Ethics, Justice, and Pastoral Theology

Volf, Miroslav. Exclusion and Embrace. Nashville: Abingdon, 1996.

O’Donovan, Oliver. The Ways of Judgment. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005.

Willard, Dallas. The Divine Conspiracy. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1998.

McKnight, Scot. A Community Called Atonement. Nashville: Abingdon, 2007.

Keller, Timothy. The Reason for God. New York: Dutton, 2008.

Annotated Bibliography

Finney, Charles G. Lectures on Systematic Theology

Finney’s Lectures provide the most complete articulation of his governmental theory of the atonement. Lecture XXXIV is especially critical, as it outlines his rejection of penal substitution and his redefinition of justice in terms of moral government. While lacking historical nuance and exegetical rigor by contemporary standards, the work is indispensable for understanding Finney’s pastoral motivations and theological assumptions.

Grotius, Hugo. Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi

Grotius’s treatise represents the classical formulation of governmental atonement theory. Written in response to Socinian denials of the atonement’s necessity, it reframes justice as deterrent and public rather than retributive. This work is essential for tracing the intellectual lineage of Finney’s theology and understanding how governmental theory emerged as a mediating position.

Stott, John. The Cross of Christ

Stott offers one of the most balanced modern defenses of penal substitution. His careful rejection of commercialism and emphasis on covenant, love, and transformation make this work especially valuable for addressing Finney’s moral concerns without abandoning substitution. Frequently cited in evangelical theology, it functions as a constructive counterpoint to governmental models.

Wright, N. T. The Day the Revolution Began

Wright’s work challenges narrow penal-substitutionary frameworks by situating the atonement within the narrative of Israel’s exile and restoration. While not endorsing governmental theory, Wright’s emphasis on public justice, covenant, and new creation overlaps with Finney’s concerns and provides a useful contemporary dialogue partner.

Rutledge, Fleming. The Crucifixion

Rutledge offers a robust, theologically rich account of substitution, wrath, and judgment within an apocalyptic framework. Her work demonstrates how penal substitution can be articulated in a way that preserves moral seriousness and pastoral depth, directly countering the concern that substitution trivializes sin or justice.

Crisp, Oliver D. Deviant Calvinism

Crisp’s analytic approach clarifies key misunderstandings surrounding imputation, punishment, and substitution. His work is particularly helpful for responding to Finney’s objection that penal substitution entails injustice or moral incoherence.